A Comparison of the Relative Success of Two Pay Incentive Plans Under Controlled Conditions by Poole, Richard J.
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations 
Fall 1981 
A Comparison of the Relative Success of Two Pay Incentive Plans 
Under Controlled Conditions 
Richard J. Poole 
University of Central Florida 
 Part of the Industrial and Organizational Psychology Commons 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/rtd 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, 
please contact STARS@ucf.edu. 
STARS Citation 
Poole, Richard J., "A Comparison of the Relative Success of Two Pay Incentive Plans Under Controlled 
Conditions" (1981). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 582. 
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/rtd/582 
A Comparison of the Relative Success 
of Two Pay Incentive Plans 
Under Controlled Conditions 
BY 
RICHARD J. POOLE 
B.A., Winthrop College, 1979 
THESIS 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the Master of Science degree in 
Industrial Psychology 
in the Graduate Studies Program 
of the College of Arts and Sciences 
University of Central Florida 
Orlando, Florida 
Fall Term 
1981 
Table of Contents 
Page 
Introduction •.••••.••••••• ,................. 1 
Method .........•.•.......• . . •..• . .......... 11 
Re s u 1 t s • ., • ,. • • • • • • • • • • • ., • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 5 
Discussion •• • ••••••••••.•• , •••••••••••••.•••. 18 
Appendix •••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••.••••• 24 
Re f e r e n c e s • • ., • • ,. ,. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ,. • • • • • • ~ • 2 7 
iii 
Introduction 
Piece-rate wages have been in existence since 604 
B.C., when Babylonian women were paid with food; the amount 
of food they received was dependent upon the amount of 
cloth they could weave (Alford, cited in Shapiro, 1978). 
During the 1500's, wh ile the fleet called the nArsenal of 
Venice'' was being constructed, many progressive labor con-
cepts were implemented to ensure the highest quality and 
the highest productivity of shipbuilders. AITI()ng thes e 
concepts was the use of a piece-rate incent i ve system 
(Lane, cited in Shapiro, 1978). During the English 
industrial revolution, it was common knowledge that an 
individual working in a piece-rate incentive situation was 
likely to p r oduce more than one working for a daily or 
weekly wage (George, 1972). It is not a recent d ~ s~overy 
that a piece-rate incentive plan, as a means of administer-
ing wages, can motivate workers to produce more than can 
wages paid on an hourly basis. Many studies and authors 
have provided evidence to this fact (e.g., Lawler, 1971; 
McManis & Dick,l973; Pritchard, Dunnette, & Jorgenson, 
1972; Rothe, 1946; Schneider & Olson, 1970; Schwab, 1973i 
Shapiro, 1978). Furthermore, managers and scientists have 
actively sought to improve the effectiveness of piece-rate 
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incentive plans through various methods. One of the 
primary ways has been to manipulate the amount of money 
received for each unit produced. Other methods include 
establishing scientific techniques on which to base rates, 
as well as developing various types of piece-rate incen-
tive plans, such as differential piece~rate plans, 
multiple piece-rate plans and task and premium bonus 
systems (Lawler, 1971). 
Although research indicates that piece-rate incentive 
plans will generally increase production, research has 
also evidenced side effects that serve to limit the effec-
tiveness of piece-rate incentive plans (Lawler, 1971). 
The side effect that has received the greatest amount of 
attention is the presence of norms that serve to restrict 
production. Mathewson (cited in Lawler, 1971) concluded 
that workers on a piece-rate plan in a machine shop 
produced only 50 percent of what they were capable of 
producing. Parsons (1974) reported that regardless of 
management's efforts to improve the effectiveness of the 
incentive system, workers in the Bank Wiring Room Study at 
Hawthorne maintained a steady production rate. Both 
Parsons and Mathewson stated that group norms were present 
that served to restrict production beyond an acceptable 
rate. Each worker, in both situations, was careful not to 
exceed the limit. Conformity to the norms which served to 
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restrict production was ensured by threats of social ostra-
cism, degradation, and even physical punishment. Workers 
in both studies reported that fear of the lowering of the 
rates, reduction of hours and loss of jobs were their 
reasons for restricting production. 
Whyte (1955) compiled a detailed analysis of incentive 
systems and their implications in industry. Although 10 
years earlier Rothe {1946) had concluded that production 
was a function of the magnitude of incentives available to 
workers, Whyte realized other implications of incentive 
systems and their effects on production. Whyte understood 
the group pressure to conform to norms that restricted 
production. He stated that the worker respon~s not only to 
the monetary reward offered by the incentive plan, but also 
to the total factory environment in which the individual 
works. This, of course, includes one's co-workers. Thus, 
one stands in a state of confusion as to which stimulus to 
respond to: the incentive plan or the co-worker. Whyte 
(1955) suggested that the incentive plan places the worker 
in a situation of being unable to determine whether the 
symbols ("words or physical objects that come to stand for 
relations of man to man, man to the physical world, and 
also for relations between man and physical objects and 
other men", p. 191) presented represent reward, punishment 
or a combination of the two. Whyte further suggested that 
a given response would be highly influenced by the human 
relations within the situation. 
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In the development of a theory of human relations and 
incentives, Whyte expanded on the influence of co-workers 
and the work group first discussed by Roethlisberger and 
Dickson (summarized in Hornans, 1950}. Whyte brought out 
the fact that the workers perceived themselves as consti-
tuting one group and perceived management as constituting 
another group, both possessing their own norms and values, 
as well as their own structures and leaders. While 
production is a primary interest of both groups, it is 
viewed from two frames of reference. Management desires to 
maximize production and lower cost. The workers wish to 
produce enough to receive a fair wage; however, for reasons 
known o nly to the workers, they will not produce up to 
their full potential. Thus, workers conforming to the 
group norms that serve to restr1ct production add stability 
to the group. Whyte also points out that a change in the 
incentive rate would disrupt the stability of the group. 
From the worker's point of view, an increase in production 
would most likely result in a change in the incentive 
rate. Thus conforming to group norms that restricted 
production served two purpos~~: a) to increase stability 
of the work group, and b) to decrease the threat of 
disruption of group stability. From this point, Whyte 
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seems to be inadvertently leading to the conclusion that if 
the two groups could perhaps trust one another, norms that 
serve to restrict production would not possess such signif-
icance. Although Whyte (1955) suggested that ''financial 
incentives are both a technical engineering problem and a 
human relations problem" (p.261), he failed to make sugges-
tions or recommendations which would perhaps create a work 
environment conducive to a positive response to a piece-
rate incentive system. 
Group-Based Plans 
In a reexamination of the Hawthorne effect, Parsons 
(1974) suggested additional reasons for the findings at 
Hawthorne that are supported by more recent research. 
Parsons noted that the generally accepted assumption that 
any change resulted in increased productivity is a myth. 
He stated that this assumption is not supported by all of 
the data gathered at Hawthorne. In an analysis of the 
inconsistent findings leading to the myth, Parsons noted 
several important distinctions between the different exper-
imental situations. In the situations where production 
did, in fact, rise significantly (in the Relay Assembly 
Test Room), workers felt assured that incentives would not 
decrease, indicating a climate of trust between workers and 
management. Parsons suggests this is perhaps a necessary 
condition for rate increases, but not a sufficient 
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condition. Attention must also be given to the fact 
that, in the Relay Assembly Test Room, workers were paid on 
the small-group compensation basis (five workers consti-
tuted a group). Therefore, each worker perceived a closer 
relationship between pay and performance (March & Simon; 
Marriot; Whyte; cited in Parsons 1974}. In addition, 
Parsons (1974) suggested that "subsequent performance was 
adjusted as a result of information received about prior 
performance" {p.928). Although research on the pure 
motivational effects of information feedback is controver-
sial (Chapanis, 1964), Locke (1968) found that information 
feedback does have cueing effects, as well as a goal-
setting motivational effect. Locke found that subjects 
established goals as a result of receiving feedback on 
prior performance. In summary, Parsons, referring to group 
plans, stated three conditions that would lead to a 
positive response to a piece-rate incentive system in a 
group situation: trust that management will not lower the 
incentive rate, pay that is more directly related to 
performance, and a system which allows for meaningful 
feedback on performance. 
Numerous studies have researched the predictability of 
expectancy theo~y in regard to employee motivation and 
performance. Heneman and Schwab (1972) provided an inform-
ative evaluation of this research, as did Graen (1969). 
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Additional research has been specifically directed toward 
incentive and compensation systems and their relationships 
to employee performance, satisfaction and effort (Galbraith 
& Cummings, 1967; Hackman & Porter, 1968; Schwab, 1973; 
Schwab & Dyer, 1973; Yukl, Wexley, & Seymore, 1972). Of 
particular interest is a study carried out by Camrnann and 
Lawler (1973). In an effort to compare two group-based pay 
incentive plans, one perceived as successful and one 
perceived as unsuccessful, the authors revealed three 
conditions that were thought to elicit a positive response 
to the incentive plan perceived to be successful: 1) a ) 
trusting climate between workers and management, 2) a close I 
relationship between pay and performance, and 3) a pay plan 
that is easily understood and is therefore meaningful. 
Cammann and Lawler stated that expectancy theory predicts a 
positive response to an incentive plan where the three 
conditions are met. The employee's response to the incen-
tive system was deemed positive by virtue of the fact that 
workers sought to produce as much as possible. In addi-
tion, there were no apparent norms present serving to 
restrict production and thus no sanctions, such as social 
isolation or ostracism, to ensure conformity of the norms. 
In fact, workers stated, " ••• the group and supervisor 
supported higher productivity" (p. 166). The conclusion 
that expectancy theory could successfully predict the 
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positive response was made after comparing performance 
behavior predicted by a mathematical model to actual 
employee performance. Although these findings of predicta-
bility remain important, the assessment of the three 
conditions which enhance the likelihood of a positive 
response to the incentive plan are of particular interest. 
These conditions are highly similar to the conditions 
stated by Parsons (1974) and the importance of each has 
been exemplified in one or more of the following studies 
which were directed toward expectancy theory and 
performance, satisfaction and effort: Galbraith and 
Cummings (1967), Graen (1969), James, Hartman, Stebbins, 
and Jones (1977), Lawler ana Hackman (1969), and Schwab, 
(1973) suggested that tying pay to performance was a 
necessary condition in order for an incentive plan to exert 
a significant and predictable impact on performance. In 
addition, Schwab (1973) found that employees tended to be 
more highly motivated where pay was perceived as being 
directly related to performance. In reference to trust 
between management and workers, Lawler and Hackman (1969) 
concluded that trust was an important determinant of 
employee response to pay incentive systems. James, et al. 
(1977) found that psychological climate was significantly 
related to various instrumentalities; consequently, one may 
safely conclude that a trusting climate does effect 
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performance. In reference to "a plan that is easily 
understood," it would be virtually impossible to design an 
incentive plan where pay was perceived to be directly 
related to performance, but the plan was too complex to be 
understood. Carnmann and Lawler (1973) reported that of the 
two group plans included in the study, the successful 
incentive plan was much less complex than the unsuccessful 
plan where one encountered great difficulty in calculating 
one's pay for a given time period. 
Individual-Based Plans 
Lawler {1971) stated, "It has been suggested, although 
not proven, that restrictive norms are less likely to 
develop when a group incentive plan is used" (p. 129)$ The 
fact that neither Cammann and Lawler (1973) nor Parsons 
(1974) addressed individual-based incentive plans, leaves a 
significant aspect of pay incentive plans unresolved. The 
purpose of the present investigation is to address the 
following issue: Are restrictive norms a thing of the past 
in a factory where large amounts of money are budgeted each 
year for human relations concerns, or do these norms still 
serve to undermine the work of engineers, human relations 
departments and management? More specifically, can 
restrictive norms be eliminated in individual pay-incentive 
situations, as well as in group pay-incentive situations 
through the presence of the three conditions (a trusting 
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climate between management and workers, a pay plan that is 
easily understood and thus allowing for meaningful feed-
back and a plan where pay is directly related to 
performance) suggested by Camrnann and Lawler (1973) and 
Parsons (1974) and supported by additional recent applied 
psychological research? It is hypothesized that the 
presence of the three conditions will preclude the presence 
of restrictive norms in individual-based pay situations, as 
well as in group-based pay situations. 
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Method 
Subjects 
The subjects consisted of 60 individuals working under 
pay incentive plans in a large industrial manufacturing 
plant, 28 under a group plan and 32 under an individual 
plan. All subjects held skilled positions and were random-
ly selected. Basic demographi~ data were collected to 
determine the comparability of the two groups. The results 
are presented in Table 1. A slight difference in age was 
found between the means of the two groups {31.31<36.86, 
p<.OS). A difference in the average number of years with 
the company was also significant (6<7.59, p<.OS). 
Questionnaire 
A quest:onnaire was used to collect the following data: 
demographic, control variables (presenc~ of the three 
conditions) and dependent variable (absence or presence of 
restrictive norms). A copy of the questionnaire is 
presented in the Appendix. Items 1-4 were each measures of 
the control variables. Item 1 measured the degree of the 
perceived relationship between pay and performance. Items 
2 and 4 measured varying degrees of understanding of the 
pay plan. Item 3 measured the degree of trust that the pay 
plan would not be changed. 
Items 4-8 composed a scale to determine the absence or 
presence of restrictive norms. Absence or presence of 
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Table 1 
Comparison of Demographic Data 
Item Individual-Based Group-Based t-va1ue 
Pay Plans Pay Plans 
(n=32) (n=28) 
.Age X = 31.31 X = 36.86 -2.42* 
s = 7.6 s = 9.85 
Number of 
Years 
Completed 
- -in School X = 12.19 X = 11.75 1.13 
s - 1.42 s - 1.6 
Number of 
Years in 
Company 6 - 7.59 -2.65* X = X = 
s = 2.63 s = 2.19 
* p<.05 
restrictive norms could also be termed the degree of 
successfulness of a pay plan. 
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The degree of agreement or disagreement to each item 
was measured on a seven-point graphic rating scale. The 
numbers were defined as follows: 
Procedure 
7 - Completely Agre·e 
6 - Mostly Agree 
5 - Slightly Agree 
4 - Neither Agree nor Disagree 
3 - Slightly Disagree 
2 - Mostly Disagree 
1 - Completely Disagree 
The study was conducted in an industrial manufacturing 
plant that utilized individual-based and group-based pay 
incentive plans. All of the plans had been in effect for 
over 12 months. In fact, they had been relatively 
unchanged since the opening of this particular plant more 
than 10 years ago. The study was carried out inside the 
plant. 
Subjects that worked the afternoon shift reported to 
work one-half hour early while subjects that worked the day 
shift remained one-half hour after the end of their shift. 
Thus, the study involved two separate sessions in which the 
subjects completed the questionnaires. The same procedure 
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was used in both sessions. Each subject was given a 
questionnaire which was marked to correspond with the type 
of pay plan under which they worked, I for those working 
under an individual-based plan and II for those working 
under a group-based plan. Questionnaires remained face-
down until everyone received their copy. The experimenter 
then read the directions and asked if there were any 
questions regarding what they were to do. Subjects were 
asked to raise their hand upon completing the questionnaire 
so the experimenter could collect them. Everyone was asked 
to sit quietly until all questionnaires had been collected. 
In addition, subjects were informed that the experi-
menter was an external constultant not employed by nor 
under contract by the organization. The subjects were also 
informed that the organization would, however, receive the 
results of the study. 
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Results 
Table 2 presents the group means for each item 
representing the control variables {presence or absence of 
the three conditions) for both groups. The table also 
presents the t-values calculated between the means of the 
two groups on each of the items. 
The group means calculated for item 1 indicate that 
the employees in both the individual-based and group-based 
groups perceive a relationship between their pay and their 
performance. The difference between the two means was not 
signif i cant at the .05 level of confidence. 
The group means calculated for items 2 and 4, related 
items , indicate that the employees in both groups under-
stand the pay plan and can actually calculate their weekly 
earnings. The difference between the two means was not 
significant at the .05 level of confidence. 
The group means calculated for item 3 indicate that 
the employees in both groups are between slightly disagree 
and neutral in terms of their trust that the pay plan would 
not be changed regardless of how much they produced~ The 
difference between the means was not significant at the .05 
level of confidence. 
The absence or presence of restricted norms was 
measured on a four-item scale. Group means were calculated 
for both groups to determine whether or not the employees 
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perceived restrictive norms operating within their work 
group. As defined by the rating scale, a mean of greater 
than 4 would indicate that the employees perceived no 
restrictive norms operating within the work group. The 
means, 6.12 for the individual-based group and 5.76 for the 
group-based group, indicate that both groups perceive no 
norms operating within the work group which serve to 
restrict production. A t-test indicated that the 
difference between the means was not significant (t = 1.2, 
alpha= .05). 
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Table 2 
Group Means Describing Work Attitudes 
Item Individual - Based Group-Based *t-
Pay Plans Pay Plans value 
(n=32) {n=28) 
1. 'fhe amount of 
pay that I 
earn depends on 
how hard I work. 5.25 5. 4 3 -.36 
2. I understand how 
my wages are 
calculated. 5.97 6.32 1,06 
3 • No matter how much 
I produce, the 
company will 
never change my 
rate of pay. 3.53 3.43 .. 16 
4. I can easily 
figure out 
how much I should 
be paid at the 
end of the week. 5.22 5.96 -1.48 
* No t-values were significant (alpha = .05) 
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Discussion 
The results indicate that there are no restrictive 
norms operating within either of the work groups that 
participated in the study. This finding appears to be a 
statement regarding the success of the pay plans in 
eliciting a positive reaction from the employees. Subjects 
reported that they seek to earn as much as possible by 
producing as much as possible and do not feel any pressure 
to produce less than possible from fellow workers, nor do 
fellow workers interfere with their attempts to achieve 
high productivity. More often than not, management would 
agree that attitudes and opinions such as these would be an 
indication of a successful pay incentive plan, or plans, as 
the case may be. The importance of these findings is 
voluminous. Every pay incentive plan developed and 
utilized by management is intended to elicit a positive 
response. However, the factors that affect the degree of 
success of a pay plan are of overriding importance. Isola-
tion of these factors could lead to a prescription for 
successful pay plans. Although this study was not intended 
to isolate factors that could elicit a positive response to 
pay incentive plans, the study intended to and was success-
ful in providing information on three factors believed to 
be important in eliciting a positive response to a pay 
incentive plan. 
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The three factors which were measured in this study 
are the relationship between pay and performance, under-
standing of the pay plan and an attitude of worker trust 
toward management regarding the pay plan. The results 
indicate that two of the factors are present to a very high 
degree in both the groups participating in the study. 
Subjects in both groups strongly agreed that the amount of 
pay they earned depended on how hard they worked. This 
indicates a strong relationship between pay and perfor-
mance, a factor given significance by both Lawler (1973) 
and Parsons (1974). Subjects in both groups also strongly 
agreed that they understood the pay plan under which they 
worked, another factor given significance by both Lawler 
(1973) and Parsons (1974). In fact, subjects in both 
groups stated that they were able to calculate their weekly 
pay, which was a bit surprising to management and indus-
trial engineers. This is not to say that management and 
engineers intended for the plan to be difficult to 
understand. It was believed a problem could exist here 
because the plans under which both groups worked had to 
allow for downtime and changeovers, as well as for 
production of the individual or the group. The fact that 
the workers understood the pay incentive plan under which 
they work indicates they were receiving meaningful feedback 
regarding their performance. 
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There was overwhelming evidence of the presence of 
two influential factors in both groups participating in 
the study. Evidence of the presence of a third factor, 
trust that management would not change the pay plans, no 
matter how much one produced, is not so clear-cut. Means 
of 3.53 for Group I and 3.43 for Group II appear to 
indicate that both groups are at least neutral. That is, 
they are neithe r in agreement nor in disagreement with the 
statement "No matter how much I produce, the Company will 
never change my rate of pay". An important fact to bring 
out here is the variance of the scores obtained on this 
item for both groups. A variance of 6o45 for Group I and 
a variance of 5.07 for Group II indicates that a high 
degree of disagreement exist among the workers in both 
groups concerning trust that management will never change 
the pay plan as a result of exceedingly high production. 
Workers were either highly confident that management would 
not change the plan or they were quite sure that 
exceedingly high production would result in a change in 
the pay plan. The issue is, without a doubt, affected by 
present economic conditions. Although the company has 
experienced no major layoffs or cutbacks in production, 
present economic conditions hardly allow one to feel 
immune from the possibility of layoffs and cutbacks. 
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The effect of present economic conditions on worker 
attitudes leads the experimenter to consider that the 
minimal lack of trust among workers that management will 
not change the rate of pay may not be a true lack of trust 
in management at all. It is apparent that the organization 
has no control over the present national economic condition, 
and thus has very little control over worker attitudes 
concerning possible changes in incentive rates. The fact 
that factors external to the organization may have elicited 
a neutral response to the item measuring the presence of 
this condition is particularly likely in this instance as 
the orga n ization has never lowered rates or altered the pay 
system unless a change has been made in the work method or 
machinery. The management reportedly continues to make 
this policy clear to all employees and are proud of their 
adherence to this policy. 
Nonetheless, data do not allow the the experimenter 
to state that the trust in management factor is present for 
either of the two groups. However, the fact that workers 
reported an absence of restrictive norms in both groups 
indicates that the organizational climate is such that 
workers under both individual-based and group-based plans 
work to earn as much as possible by producing as much as 
possible. Is this not the bottom line in the development 
and implementation of incentive pay plans; to create 
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conditions that elicit positive responses to the structure 
of the pay plan? It seems apparent that workers, in this 
study, have weighed the possible positive and negative 
outcomes and have responded positively to both the 
individual-based plan and the group-based plan. 
In summary, it was hypothesized th~t presence of the 
three factors would preclude the presence of restrictive 
norms in group-based, as well as individual-based pay 
incentive plans. The results indicate that perhaps the 
presence of only two of the factors precluded the presence 
of restrictive norms in both groups in this situation as 
the presence of one of the factors is unclear. This 
finding is contrary to a suggestion made by Lawler (1971), 
and mentioned previously, that restrictive norms are less 
likely to be present in a group-based pay incentive plan. 
It is important to point out that the external validity of 
these findings is somewhat limited by virtue of the fact 
that it was carried out in only one environment. However, 
the study did partially confirm the findings of Lawler 
(1973) and the suggestions of Parsons {1974), both of whom 
specified the importance of the three factors (relationship 
between pay and performance, understanding the pay plan and 
trust that management will not change the pay plan) in 
precluding the presence of restrictive norms. Thus the 
findings remain important in the quest to isolate the 
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factors which enhance the success of pay incentive plans. 
Related future research should perhaps provide more 
empirical evidence on the factors discussed in this study 
in addition to discovering conditions or methods to 
maximize the effects of the factors. 
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APPENDIX 
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Age Number of Years in 'Ihis Position 
------
Number of Years Cbrnpleted in School 
------------
Number of Years with the Cbmpany 
------------
INSTRUcriONS: Carefully read the following statements and choose the 
description on the 7-point scale provided for each 
statement which most closely describes your degree of 
agreement or disagreement by placing the corresponding 
number from the scale in the blank beside each statement. 
-----
-----
1. 'Ihe arrount of pay that I earn depends on hOW' hard I work. 
7 = Completely Agree 
6 = Mostly Agree 
5 = Slightly Agree 
4 = Neither Agree nor Disagree 
3 = Slightly Disagree 
2 = Mostly Disagree 
1 = Completely Disagree 
2. I understand how my wages are calculated. 
7 = Oompletely Agree 
6 = Mostly Agree 
5 = Slightly Agree 
4 = Neither Agree nor Disagree 
3 = Slightly Disagree 
2 = Mostly Disagree 
1 = Cbmpletely Disagree 
3. lb matter how much I produce, the Company will never 
change my rat.e of pay. 
7 = Completely Agree 
6 = Y.ostly Agree 
5 = Slightly Agree 
4 = Neither Agree nor Disagree 
3 = Slightly Disagree 
2 = Mostly Disagree 
1 = Completely Disagree 
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_____ 4. I can easily figure out how much I should be p3.id at the 
end of the week. 
-----
-----
-----
7 = Completely Agree 
6 = Mostly Agree 
5 = Slightly Agree 
4 = Neither Agree nor Disagree 
3 = Slightly Disagree 
2 = Mostly Disagree 
1 = Completely Disagree 
5. I w:>rk at a pace that best fits my own attitude as to 
how much I should produce. 
7 = Completely Agree 
6 = Mostly Agree 
5 = Slightly Agree 
4 = Neither Agree nor Disagree 
3 = Slightly Disagree 
2 = Mostly Disagree 
1 = Corrpletely Disagree 
6. I try to earn as much as pc>ssible by producing as much 
as I can. 
7 = Completely Agree 
6 = Mostly Agree 
5 = Slightly Agree 
4 = Neither Agree nor Disagree 
3 = Slightly Disagree 
2 = Mostly Disagree 
1 = Oompletely Disagree 
7. I don • t feel any pressure frcm fellow workers to produce 
less than I can produce. 
7 = Completely Agree 
6 = Mostly Agree 
5 = Slightly Agree 
4 = Neither Agree nor Disagree 
3 = Slightly Disagree 
2 = Mostly Disagree 
1 = Completely Disagree 
8. Fellow- workers do not interfere with 1t!f attempts to 
proouce as ITUJCh as I can. 
7 = Oompletely Agree 
6 = Mostly Agree 
5 = Slightly Agree 
4 = Neither Agree nor Disagree 
3 = Slightly Disagree 
2 = Mostly Disagree 
1 = Oompletely Disagree 
27 
References 
Camrnann, Cortlandt, & Lawler, E.E. Employee reactions to 
a pay incentive plan. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
1973, 58, 163-172. 
Chapanis, A. Knowledge of performance ~s an incentive in 
repetitive, monotonous tasks. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 1964, 48, 263-26 7. 
Galbraith, J., & Cummings, C.C. An empirical investigation 
of the determinants of task performance: Interactive 
effects between instrumentality - valence - and 
motivation - ability. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Performance, 1967, ~' 237-257. 
Ge o rge, c.s. The history of management thought. {2nd edo) 
Englewood Cliffs, NoJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1972. 
Graen, G. Instrumentality of work motivation; Some experi-
mental iesults and suggested modifications. Journal 
of Applied Psycholo~ Mono9raph I 1969 f 53 I ( 2, pt. 2) r 
.l-25. 
Hackman, J.R., & Porter , L.W. Expectancy theory predic-
tions of work effectiveness. Organizational Behavior 
and Human Performance, 1968, 1, 417-426. 
Heneman, H.G., & Schwab, D.P. Evaluation of research on 
expectancy theory predictions of employee performance. 
Psychological Bulletin, 1972, 78, 1-9. 
Homans, G c. The human group. New York: 
and World, 1950. 
Harcourt, Brace 
James, L.R., Hartman, A., Stebbins, M.S., & Jones, A.P. 
Relationships between psychological climate and a VIE 
model for work motivation. Personnel Psychology, 
1977, 30, 229-254. -
Lawler, E. E. Pa_y and organizational effectiveness: A 
psychological view. New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1971. 
28 
Lawler, E.E., & Hackman, J.R. Impact of employee partici-
pation in the development of pay incentive plans: A 
field experiment, Journal of Applied Psychology, 1969, 
53, 467-471. 
Locke, E.A. Toward a theory of task motivation and incen-
tives. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 
1968, lr 157-189. 
McManis, D.L., & Dick, W.G. Monetary incentives in 
today's industrial setting. Personnel Journal, 52, 
1973, 387-392. 
March, J.G., & Simon, H.A. Organizations. New York: 
Wiley, 1958. 
Parsons, H. Mcilvaine. What happened at Hawthorne? 
Science, 1974, 183, 922-932. 
Pritchard, R.D., Dunnette, M.D., & Jorgenson, D.O. Effects 
of perceptions of equity and inequity on worker 
performance and satisfaction, Journal of Applied 
Psychology Monograph, 1972, 56, 75-91. 
Rothe, H.F. Output rates among butter wrappers: II. 
Frequency distributions and an hypothesis regarding 
the restriction of output. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 1946, 30, 320-327. 
Schneider, B., & Olson, L.K. Effort as a correlate of 
organizational reward system and individual values. 
Personnel Psychology, 1970, 23, 313-326. 
Schwab, D.P. Impact of alternative compensation systems on 
pay valence and instrumentalities. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 1973, 58, 308-312. 
Schwab, D.P., & Dyer, C.D. The motivational impact of a 
compensation system on employee performance. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1973, 
9, 215-225. 
29 
Shapiro, J.H. 
present. 
Pay incentives and work motivation past and 
Psychological Reports, 1978, 42, 124-126. 
Whyte, W.F. (Ed.) Money and motivation: 
incentives in industry. New York: 
An analysis of 
Harper, 1955. 
Yukl, Gary, Wexley, Kenneth N., & Seymore, James D. 
Effectiveness of pay incentives under variable ratio 
and continuous reinforcement schedules. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 1972, 56, 19-23. 
